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Proportionality review in possession proceedings 
Corby Borough Council v Nicholle Scott; West Kent Housing 
Association Ltd v Jack Haycraft [2012] EWCA Civ 276; [2012] 
H.L.R. 23. 
After a protracted and rather painful process of dithering and 
obfuscation,1 the Supreme Court finally accepted in Manchester 
City Council v Pinnock2 and Hounslow LBC v Powell3 that art.8 
ECHR required proportionality evaluation by a court or tribunal to 
apply in all possession cases involving a person’s home; and that 
art.8Sch.1 of the HRA 1998 should bear the same meaning in this 
context in domestic law as art.8 ECHR bears in international law. 
As statements of principle, those conclusions are attractively 
straightforward. Difficulties arise when one takes the next step and 
asks what it is that Pinnock and Powell proportionality actually 
means. It may be that the principle is in essence very hard to 
separate from Wednesbury irrationality. That certainly is the view 
taken by many claimants of Pinnock’s effect, premised in part on 
the frequent suggestions made by the Supreme Court and ECtHR4 
(and previously by the House of Lords in respect of so-called 
‘public law’ defences in possession proceedings) that it would only 
be in a very rare or exceptional case that such a defence would 
even be seriously arguable, let alone ultimately successful.5 
                                                          
1
 See generally I. Loveland, “A tale of two trespassers part 1 and 2” (2009) 
EHRLR pp.148–169 and pp.495–511. 
2
 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2011] 2 A.C. 104. 
3
 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 A.C. 186. 
4
 cf. Lord Neuberger in Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 at [45]: 
“Although it cannot be described as a point of principle, it seems that the 
EurCtHR has also franked the view that it will only be in exceptional cases that 
article 8 proportionality would even arguably give a right to continued 
possession where the applicant has no right under domestic law to remain: 
McCann v UK (2008) 47 EHRR 40, para 54; Kay v UK (App no 37341/06) 
[2010] ECHR 1322, para 73” 
5
 See for example the views expressed by J. Holbrook , “Valuable Possession” 
(2011) 161 NLJ 425 25 March 11). See especially Lord Bingham in Kay v 
Lambeth [2006] 2 A.C. 465, 491–492, para.29, to the effect that “only in very 
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The “seriously arguable” point does not have just a substantive 
dimension; i.e. that the defence will ultimately fail. It also has 
important procedural or case management implications. CPR Pt 
55.8 allows the court to dispose of the case at first hearing on an 
essentially summary basis unless the defendant convinces the court 
that the claim can be: “genuinely disputed on a basis which 
appears to be substantial”. 
The suggestion that art.8 makes no meaningful difference may 
overstate the case from a claimant’s perspective, given that the 
Supreme Court in Pinnock was at least explicit in declining to be 
explicit about exactly what proportionality might mean, either as a 
substantive defence or in terms of its implications for case 
management in the county courts. Lord Neuberger’s sole judgment 
indicated that the Supreme Court was happy to pass the buck on 
this question to the bottom rungs of the judicial hierarchy: 
“[57] …the court’s obligation under article 8(2), to consider the proportionality 
of making the order sought, does represent a potential new obstacle to the 
making of an order for possession. The wide implications of this obligation will 
have to be worked out. As in many situations, that is best left to the good sense 
and experience of judges sitting in the County Court”. 
From a defendant’s perspective, the only obviously helpful 
prescriptive tool in Pinnock is the now oft-quoted passage at 
para.64: 
“[64]. Sixthly, the suggestions put forward on behalf of the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, that proportionality is more likely to be a relevant issue “in 
respect of occupants who are vulnerable as a result of mental illness, physical or 
learning disability, poor health or frailty”, and that “the issue may also require 
the local authority to explain why they are not securing alternative 
accommodation in such cases” seem to us well made”. 
The proportionality point has surely now been pleaded on many 
occasions in the lower courts. But we have little idea of how often 
and with what level of “success”. Much of this “law” will be 
invisible. This is in part because it is very rare for a county court 
judgment which is not appealed ever to become widely available in 
                                                                                                                                 
exceptional cases” could “an applicant … succeed in raising an arguable case 
which would require a court to examine the issue”. 
  
 
published form. 6  Equally significantly, some claimants may 
conclude that it is ill-advised to press on in the face of what is 
ostensibly a credible defence and will settle the matter before trial.7 
The ‘visible’ law will be restricted to reported appellate judgments 
of the higher courts. We now have two post-Powell Court of 
Appeal judgments to consider on the meaning of proportionality, 
which—unhappily—do not tell us a great deal. 
The judgments of the Court of Appeal in Scott and Haycraft 
If superficially construed, the Court of Appeal’s decision in the 
joined cases of Corby BC v Scott;West Kent Housing Association 
Ltd v Jack Haycraft8 can readily be seen as pouring a good deal of 
very cold water on art.8 defences. On closer examination however, 
both defendants might be thought to have been intrinsically weak 
candidates for Pinnock protection, who also did a rather poor job 
of making the most of what little they might have had to offer, and 
whose rather abject failures could be seen as invitation to other 
defendants’ lawyers to be more selective in choosing candidates 
for an art.8 defence and more rigorous in building a case on their 
client’s behalf. 
Ms Scott had been granted an introductory tenancy by Corby 
Council in 2009. She rapidly went into rent arrears and failed to 
clear them. Although the arrears were only £300—a level at which 
                                                          
6
 Some cases occasionally appear in Current Law. Traditionally the only source 
with even a little coverage at this level has been Jan Luba and Nic Madge’s 
“Housing Law Update” which appears every month in Legal Action and often 
contains brief notes of county court cases sent in by counsel or solicitors. Web-
based sources, especially the housing law blog Nearly Legal have also begin to 
uncover some of this hidden law: http://nearlylegal.co.uk/blog/ [Accessed 
October 26, 2012]. 
7
 This may have a macro and/or a micro dimension. The micro dimension relates 
primarily to costs. The macro element relates to a fear that it is better to concede 
defended cases than run the risk of losing such a case on a point of law and 
thereby deprive oneself of what will always be an effective argument against the 
unrepresented or ineptly represented defendant. We have really no idea at all of 
the percentage of possession claims in which defendants who might have a 
plausible proportionality defence are not legally represented. 
8
 Corby BC v Scott [2012] EWCA Civ 276; [2012] H.L.R. 23. 
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it is unlikely any kind of order would be made against a secure 
tenant—Corby initiated the possession regime provided for under 
the Housing Act 1996 in a claim before the Northampton County 
Court. The regime essentially provides that a tenant can challenge 
the issue of a notice seeking possession through an internal review. 
If the authority decides to uphold the notice then—so long as it has 
complied with specified procedural requirements—its decision to 
begin possession proceedings could only be challenged on public 
law or HRA grounds.9 Ms Scott did not seek an internal review, 
and indeed seemed to underline her status as an unsatisfactory 
tenant by continuing to fail to address her arrears and engaging in 
some anti-social behaviour. 
Her claim was not dealt with summarily under CPR Pt 55.8. The 
practice at Northampton County Court appears to be that a pleaded 
art.8 defence is invariably set down for trial. In this case, the 
matter was listed for a one day hearing before a circuit judge. Ms 
Scott did little to help her case by failing to comply with arrears 
payment schedules specified in the initial court order, although her 
mother paid off the arrears on her behalf the day before the trial. 
Ms Scott’s pleadings as to the “exceptional” nature seemed to be 
limited to the facts that the arrears had in fact been paid off and 
that she had been the victim of a violent physical attack (the 
perpetrator being convicted of attempted murder) a short while 
ago. However she produced no evidence at all at trial to suggest 
that the attack made her “vulnerable” in a Pinnock sense or had 
compromised her capacity to manage her tenancy and behaviour in 
a responsible fashion. Rather surprisingly, one might think, H.H. 
Judge Hampton was persuaded it would be disproportionate to 
grant an order, on the basis both of the attack and the (belated 
settlement) of the arrears. 
Mr Haycraft had gone into occupation of his housing association 
home as a “starter tenant”. This is in effect the housing association 
equivalent of an introductory tenancy, in which tenants are granted 
an assured shorthold tenancy which becomes assured on the expiry 
                                                          
9
 The scheme is laid out in the Housing Act 1996 ss.124–130. 
  
 
of (usually) 12 months’ acceptable behaviour. 10  Mr Haycraft’s 
landlord decided to bring proceedings following various 
allegations against him of anti-social behaviour, including an 
allegation of indecent exposure (in respect of which no prosecution 
was brought). Mr Haycraft had challenged that conclusion before 
an internal review board, but his challenge was rejected. 
Rather unfortunately, the Court of Appeal’s judgment tells us 
nothing of value about the nature of that challenge. Nor are we told 
anything about the conduct of the initial hearing, before a Deputy 
District Judge, in which an outright possession order was granted, 
beyond the fact that no art.8 point was taken in the defence; 
(apparently because the case was heard before Pinnock was 
decided). Mr Haycraft’s appeal to a circuit judge did seek to raise 
proportionality issues, although we are not told on what basis the 
appeal was brought. His submissions appeared to be that he had 
not committed the alleged indecent exposure, that his behaviour 
had been unproblematic for over a year, that he had some health 
difficulties, and that he now occupied his home with a new partner 
and their child. H.H. Judge Simpkiss dismissed the appeal without 
a full hearing, presumably on the basis that the pleaded case had no 
reasonable prospect of success per CPR Pt 52(11). 
Lord Neuberger gave the sole judgment for the joined cases in 
the Court of Appeal. One assumes that he is best placed to know 
what the Supreme Court meant to do in Pinnock given that he gave 
the sole judgment in that case too. He re-stated the Pinnock view 
that there was little likelihood of a proportionality defence 
succeeding in respect of introductory or demoted tenancies, and 
that these slim prospects of success might be increased if the 
defendant was “vulnerable” and facing homelessness. 
The Court saw no merit in either defendant’s submissions. In Ms 
Scott’s case, the problem was one essentially of “relevance”. Being 
subjected to a vicious assault might well be “exceptional” in the 
overall scheme of things, but it per se had no relevance to the 
question of whether it was necessary to evict her from her home. In 
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 Housing Act 1988 ss.19A–21. 
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that regard, the comment upon which most attention may fasten is 
at para.24: 
“… There was no suggestion in the judgment, or even in the evidence, that the 
attack resulted in mental or physical injury which would render it particularly 
harmful to Ms Scott to be evicted”. 
The notion of “particularly harmful to be evicted” appears to 
allude to the probable consequence of a defendant being vulnerable 
in a Pinnock sense. Assuming that for pretty well all defendants 
being evicted is going to be “harmful” to some degree, the 
“particularly harmful” test obviously invites defendants to lay a 
sound evidential base for showing the trial court that loss of their 
home would have an especially detrimental effect upon them. 
There is likely to be little point in arguing that “particularly 
harmful” is substantively a more indulgent test than that offered in 
Pinnock. The significance of the formula from a defendant’s 
perspective lies in its intimation that it will indeed be pointless to 
raise an art.8 defence based on personal circumstances if the 
parameters of that defence are not both clearly articulated in 
principle and evidentially well-grounded. 
Scott also tells us that the paying off of arrears (at the last minute 
and by a third party) does not render a case “exceptional”.11 This 
should not be taken to mean that the way in which a defendant 
deals with her arrears in the period between the service of an initial 
notice and the trial is necessarily irrelevant. What it suggests is that 
a defendant could only usefully present this argument if she has 
through her own devices managed to maintain a consistent 
downward trend in the arrears over a substantial period of time, has 
eliminated or substantially reduced the arrears, and can 
convincingly show that such behaviour will continue in the future. 
In the same vein, the Court of Appeal suggested that Mr 
Haycraft’s reasonably lengthy period of “good behaviour” (there 
were no reported incidents of anti-social for the best part of a year 
before the hearing) cannot per se make the grant of an order 
disproportionate. Nor was the fact that he had some health 
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 Scott [2012] EWCA Civ 276 at [25]. 
  
 
problems (again not especially well supported evidentially) of any 
significance to a proportionality assessment. The judgment 
underlines the point that mere assertions as to ill-health will not 
assist a defendant in such cases. The least that will be required is 
an evidentially well-founded assertion as to really quite serious 
medical problems which would likely be exacerbated by eviction. 
We might wonder if the Court of Appeal’s conclusions as to the 
likely irrelevance of reducing arrears and behaving well will create 
a perverse incentive for defendants not to deal with arrears or stop 
causing a nuisance to neighbours if their only possible line of 
defence is proportionality review. It is certainly stock advice on the 
part of defence lawyers that a lengthy period of good behaviour 
will weigh positively in the balance at a final hearing, both because 
of their intrinsic value and because they can serve as a useful 
pointer to what will occur in future. The court seems not to have 
considered that point. But there is perhaps a more substantial 
criticism to be made of the judgment. 
The practicalities of building a defence which “appears to be 
substantial” 
CPR Pt 55.8 makes provision for the summary disposal of 
possession claims if the defendant does not dispute the claim “on 
grounds which appear to be substantial”. For claimants, this 
mechanism has the obvious attraction of being quick and cheap. 
Pinnock and Powell do tell us of course that there is no obligation 
on the claimant to predict and meet any possible art.8 defence in its 
pleadings. Nor is there any obligation on the court (except perhaps 
in a case where the defendant is not legally competent)12 to render 
any assistance in that regard to the defendant, most obviously by 
adjourning the matter briefly and urging the defendant to go and 
seek legal advice. 
As a matter of principle, Scott does seem to tell us that if a sound 
job can be and is done by the defendant’s lawyers in identifying 
the relevant legal basis of a proportionality argument and 
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 See Zehentner v Austria (20082/02) (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 22. 
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underpinning that legal argument with some cogent evidence then 
there is good reason to think that the case ought to go to trial and 
not be disposed of summarily. But the Court of Appeal does not 
seem to have considered how happily this substantive and 
evidential burden fits with the prosaic mechanics of building and 
presenting a proportionality case. 
The first problem is a pretty simple one. Paragraph 64 of 
Pinnock identifies “vulnerable” people as the most likely 
beneficiaries of a proportionality defence. It is perfectly credible to 
assume that such “vulnerable” people will be among the least 
likely to seek legal representation in a timely fashion or indeed at 
all, and so will have their cases summarily disposed of under CPR 
Pt 55.8 without any thought being given to a possible art.8 defence. 
It may be that some such defendants will get representation of sorts 
at the last minute from a duty solicitor, but it would perhaps be 
rash to assume that a duty solicitor will have the time and capacity 
to do a good enough job at very short notice on the day of a 
hearing of convincing a district judge that there is a plausible art.8 
case to be made. 
Insofar as any such case would hinge on the personal 
circumstances of the defendant, a duty solicitor is likely to have no 
evidence at all save the say-so of the defendant as to those 
circumstances. Claimants will of course regale the court with the 
supposed (per Pinnock) “exceptional” nature of an arguable art.8 
defence, and refer to Scott to suggest there is no evidence to 
indicate that evicting this defendant would be “particularly 
harmful” to her. The court will also be told that the defendant has 
had many weeks to seek legal advice, and if she has not done so 
then she is suffering a problem of her own making. As the law 
currently stands, there would nothing improper about the grant of a 
possession order on a summary basis in such circumstances. 
The practical problem does not however end with the defendants 
who fail to seek timely advice. For publicly funded defendants, the 
initial tranche of funding is generally limited to considering merits 
and drafting a defence and initial witness statement. Funding for an 
expert witness - which may be crucial if any defence lies in the 
  
 
“vulnerability” of the defendant—may not be forthcoming without 
a direction giving permission to rely on such evidence, and even if 
funding were to be available the press of time prior to an initial 
hearing may mean that such evidence cannot physically be 
produced before the hearing.13 One can readily expect claimants in 
such circumstances to fasten on the lack of expert evidence as per 
se a good reason for thinking that the personal circumstances 
dimension of a proportionality defence is not seriously arguable. 
That the Court of Appeal did not engage with these issues is 
perhaps explained by what seems to be a quite careful statement by 
Lord Neuberger to the effect that it was offering a solution to the 
particular cases before it, not a generalised prescription: 
“36 …[W]e were told that there was no consistency of approach in different 
County Courts as to how to proceed when a tenant raises an Article 8 
proportionality point in possession proceedings. In some courts, the case is 
automatically listed for a hearing on the merits of the point; in other courts, the 
case remains in the usual housing possession list, and is then (depending on the 
court) (i) adjourned for fuller consideration, (ii) automatically re-listed for a 
hearing, or (iii) briefly considered and then either rejected or adjourned as under 
(i) or re-listed as under (ii). 
37 Although we were asked to do so, it does not appear to me to be appropriate 
for us to give firm guidance on the procedure to be adopted in possession cases 
where the tenant raises Article 8. We simply do not have the information 
available to give such guidance….. 
39 The only specific point I would make is to emphasise the desirability of a 
judge considering at an early stage (normally on the basis of the tenant’s 
pleaded case on the issue) whether the tenant has an arguable case on Article 8 
proportionality, before the issue is ordered to be heard. If it is a case which 
cannot succeed, then it should not be allowed to take up further court time and 
expense to the parties, and should not be allowed to delay the landlord’s right to 
possession. I accept, however, that it may well be that even that cannot be an 
absolute rule. Apart from that, questions of procedure in this area should 
perhaps be considered by the CPR Committee, and, meanwhile, Designated 
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 One of the concealed cutbacks in the legal aid budget seems to be being 
effected by the simple expedient of he LSC not making a decision on funding 
until after a hearing date has passed; by which time it is too late unless the in 
person defendant has managed to persuade the court to adjourn the proceedings. 
I am regularly briefed by several solicitors who report this happening with 
increasing frequency. 
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Civil Judges may think it worth considering such procedures in the courts for 
which they have responsibility.” 
If these paragraphs attract the attention they deserve then Scott 
has very little precedential value. It tells us that Ms Scott did not 
adduce credible evidence to support what may or may not have 
been a plausible case on the merits and that Mr Haycraft’s 
relatively brief period of good behaviour did not absolve him of 
responsibility for his earlier misdeeds. But that is perhaps not how 
the case will be (mis)-read. 
What Corby BC v Scott did not do … but what claimants will 
say it did 
The major concern that Scott raises is that because the defendants 
did not succeed it will be invoked as an authority—and accepted as 
such by housing advisers and county court judges —for a much 
wider proposition than it really supports on a careful reading; 
namely that an art.8 defence is always likely to prove a worthless 
enterprise. There are several—interconnected—reasons for 
rejecting that understanding above and beyond the simple 
observation of fact made in the preceding paragraph. 
The first is that we might easily forget that Pinnock and Powell 
proportionality is—thus far —limited to defendants who have/had 
introductory, demoted or non-secure homelessness tenancies. The 
Supreme Court’s presumption in Pinnock and Powell that 
proportionality in such cases should look much like irrationality 
rests on two supposed bases: the first that the low level of security 
attached to such tenancies is the result of considered legislative 
decision; the second that there are quite rigorous procedural 
safeguards attached to those substantive regimes.14 
The second is that Pinnock and Powell—and Corby BC v Scott—
only really broach what we might call the “personal 
circumstances” (or per Scott “particularly harmful”) dimension of 
proportionality as a doctrine. This is a perception of proportionality 
                                                          
14
 The second point is very strong in relation to demoted tenancies; moderately 
so in relation to introductory tenancies; but rather hard to see at all in respect of 
non-secure homelessness tenancies. 
  
 
which is concerned only with outcome at the end of the litigation 
process: Given the personal circumstances of this defendant, would 
it be proportionate for the court to grant a possession order? But 
the more interesting and perhaps quantitatively more important 
question is whether art.8 proportionality can in principle also reach 
to the claimant’s conduct of its decision-making processes, and it if 
can do so in principle in what circumstances will it do so in 
practice and with what degree of rigour will courts scrutinise those 
processes? 
In Pinnock, the Supreme Court rejected what we might call the 
“Huang” notion of proportionality as appropriate for possession 
cases. In Huang, 15  an immigration case, the House of Lords 
accepted that in that context proportionality would bear a meaning 
similar to that deployed by the Canadian courts in its Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedom jurisprudence under the so-
called “Oakes” test.16 The Canadian Supreme Court offered this 
analysis in Oakes: 
“69..[T]wo central criteria must be satisfied. First, the objective, which the 
measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to 
serve, must be ‘of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally 
protected right or freedom’:…..It is necessary, at a minimum, that an objective 
relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic 
society before it can be characterized as sufficiently important. 
70. Second, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the party 
invoking s.1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably 
justified. This involves a form of proportionality test … There are, in my view, 
three important components of a proportionality test. First, the measures adopted 
must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not 
be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be 
rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally 
connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair ‘as little as possible’ 
the right or freedom in question…. Third, there must be a proportionality 
between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the 
Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as 
of‘sufficient importance’.” 
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 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007]  UKHL 11; 
[2007] 2 A.C. 167.  
16 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103. 
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The court manifestly exercises an intrusive merits jurisdiction 
under the Oakes test, and one which moreover reaches to matters 
of purpose and conduct as well as outcome. The test imposes a 
substantial burden on the claimant. This is presumably why the 
Supreme Court in Powell thought it an inapposite test in the 
context of (some; i.e. demoted, introductory and non-secure 
tenancy) possession proceedings. As Lord Hope observed : 
“41 A structured [Oakes] approach of the kind that Mr Luba was suggesting 
may be appropriate, and indeed desirable, in some contexts such as that of 
immigration control which was the issue under discussion in Huang v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department. But in the context of a statutory regime that 
has been deliberately designed by Parliament, for sound reasons of social policy, 
so as not to provide the occupier with a secure tenancy it would be wholly 
inappropriate. I agree with Mr Stilitz QC for the Secretary of State that to 
require the local authority to plead its case in this way would largely collapse 
the distinction between secured and non-secure tenancies…”. 
Both Pinnock and Powell indicate that courts should accept as “a 
given” that a public authority landlord is pursuing a legitimateaim 
in an art.8 sense; the presumed legitimate aim being simply a 
desire to regain control of the premises in order to let them to 
someone else.16 This is not a matter the claimant needs to plead or 
prove as would be required under Oakes. 
It may be that we should deduce from this (and from para.41 of 
Powell) that in relation to demoted, introductory and non-secure 
tenancies matters relating to the claimant’s decision-making 
processes (i.e. a failure to take account of relevant considerations 
for example) do not raise proportionality issues, but fall instead to 
be addressed on ordinary public law grounds. That question of 
principle will perhaps present itself to a higher court in the near 
future. 
If so, one might hope that any consideration of the principle is 
undertaken in a more practically realistic fashion than occurred in 
Scott’s treatment of the outcome element of proportionality. 
Disproportionality in this sense might be inferable on the face of 
                                                          
16
 Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 at [53]. 
  
 
the claim. An obvious instance would be where a notice was issued 
by a council on the basis of rent arrears, but by the time 
proceedings are issued a delayedhousing benefitpaymenthas much 
reduced or removed the arrears.Equally, it may be possible to 
imply, at least to the extent needed for CPR Pt 55.8 purposes, a 
failure to take account of relevant considerations from what is not 
said in the claimant’s particulars or accompanying (and often 
rather perfunctory) witness statement. 
More often, such defences will emerge only after the defendant’s 
advisers have had sight of her housing file. If a defendant seeks 
competent legal advice promptly it may be possible to examine the 
housing file sufficiently in advance of the first hearing. But that 
will often not happen, and the claimant’s obvious response to 
requests to adjourn proceedings pending disclosure of the file is 
that the defendant is simply engaging in an unmeritorious fishing 
expedition to delay the inevitability of eviction and expose the 
claimant to unnecessary legal costs. 
‘Purpose’ and ‘conduct’ issues were not raised in Scott, so the 
law on this point remains very unclear even in relation to demoted, 
introductory and non-secure tenancies. But if a defendant does not 
fall within the Pinnock/Powell categories —if for example she is a 
former joint tenant whose partner has unbeknown to her served a 
notice to quit on the landlord which is relying on the rule in 
Hammersmith and Fulham LBC v Monk17 to evict her, or if she is a 
potential “second successor” to secure a tenancy, or if a possession 
order is granted against her on the basis of ground 8 but her arrears 
were caused by a housing benefit error which has now been 
resolved —then the door would seem to be open to argue that she 
can rely upon a Huang/Oakes understanding of proportionality. It 
would be unfortunate if a misleading “headline” as to the effect of 
Scott (i.e. “Art 8 defences fail again”) gains sufficient currency to 
“chill” either the readiness of defendants’ lawyers to press such 
arguments and the willingness of county court judges to accept that 
they “appear to be substantial”. The stern ticking off delivered by 
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 Hammersmith and Fulham LBC v Monk [1992] 1 A.C. 478; [1991] 3 
W.L.R. 1144. 
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Lord Neuberger to the trial judge in Scott might well have such an 
impact on low level judicial behaviour. 
Conclusion 
Article 8 and public law defences in the context of residential 
possession proceedings can raise complicated jurisprudential 
issues. Pinnock answered some questions and in turn raised several 
others. Scott takes us no further along the road to figuring out how 
significant an impact art.8 will have on the management and 
outcome of possession proceedings. It maybe however that we just 
delude ourselves if we try to characterise the law—whether it be 
the visible law in the reports or the invisible law in the lower 
courts—as a destination. It is perhaps better seen, at least in the 
medium term, as a journey; within which Scott proves to be no 
more than a five minute stop. 
Ian Loveland 
